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Abstract
In the papers by Alvarez et al. and Pathak and Sanghi a non-
commutative based public key exchange is described. A similiar version of
it has also been patented (US7184551). In this paper we present a poly-
nomial time attack that breaks the variants of the protocol presented in
the two papers. Moreover we show that breaking the patented cryptosys-
tem US7184551 can be easily reduced to factoring. We also give some
examples to show how efficiently the attack works.
1 Introduction
We first describe the noncommutative key exchange presented in [1] and [5].
Consider the group G = GL(n,Fq) of invertible matrices over the finite field
Fq and M1,M2 ∈ G. Let the triple (G,M1,M2) be public, with M1,M2 ∈
GL(n,Fq). Let M1,M2 be elements in G such that M1M2 6= M2M1. Let the
public key be (G,M1,M2).
• Alice chooses (a1, a2) ∈ Z
2 and sends C1 =M
a1
1 M
a2
2 to Bob
• Bob chooses (b1, b2) ∈ Z
2 and sends C2 =M
b1
1 C1M
b2
2 to Alice
• Alice computes K =M−a11 C2M
−a2
2
As a result Alice and Bob can compute the secret key K = M b11 M
b2
2 . The
purpose of this paper is to show that K can be computed in O(n3) field opera-
tions from C1 and C2.
1
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Cayley-Hamilton Theorem
Let fM be the characteristic polynomial of M . Then fM (M) = 0. As a re-
sult every power of M can be written in terms of a linear combination of
{1,M, . . . ,Mn−1} where n is the order of the matrix. A nice proof of this
is presented in [4, p.21]
2.2 Solving homogeneous “mixed” multivariate polyno-
mial equations of degree 2
In general solving multivariate polynomial equations is NP-complete [2]. In
situations where the number of variables is much smaller than the number of
equations there exists a polynomial time algorithm. To be precise: [2] proposes
an ”expected” polynomial time algorithm to solve overdefined polynomial equa-
tions when the number of unknowns k and the number of equations m satisfy
the inequality m ≥ εk2 where ε ∈ (0, 12 ]. The expected running time is ap-
proximately of k
O( 1√
ε
)
. The aim of the paper is to use a specialized version of
this algorithm that can be proved to lead to a polynomial time algorithm that
breaks the protocols described in [1] and [5] in the generic condition. For all
other cases we refer to the euristic result in [2] that, for cryptanalytic purposes,
will be enough.
2.3 Commutative rings of matrices
Let T be an invertible matrix and define Fq[T ] to be the Fq-algebra generated
by T . In other words it will be the image of the evaluation map
ψ : Fq[x] −→Mn×n(Fq)
ψ(p(x)) := p(T ).
By Cayley Hamilton theorem it follows that Fq[T ] is a finite dimensional algebra
over Fq. The following short lemma will be useful for our purposes:
Lemma 2.1. Let p(T ) ∈ Fq[T ] ∩GLn(Fq) =: (Fq[T ])
∗ and
C(T ) := {L ∈ GLn(Fq) | LT = TL}.
Then p(T )−1 ∈ C(T ).
Proof.
p(T )−1T = (T−1p(T ))−1 = (p(T )T−1)−1 = Tp(T )−1
2
3 Performing the attack
The attack described in the following sections makes use of the elementary tools
mentioned above and this is intended to show the structural vulnerabilities of
the system. Suppose Eve is observing the key exchange, she is then able to
get the following information: {M1,M2,M
a1
1 M
a2
2 ,M
a1+b1
1 M
a2+b2
2 }. Eve first
observes Ma11 ∈ Fq[M1] and M
a2
2 ∈ Fq[M2] and that M
a1
1 M
a2
2 is in the image
of the application
ϕ : Fq[M1]× Fq[M2] −→Mn×n(Fq)
ϕ(h1(M1), h2(M2)) = h1(M1)h2(M2).
Then, we are able to write Ma11 M
a2
2 = p(M1)q(M2), for some p(x), q(x) ∈ Fq[x]
with
p(M1) =
n−1∑
i=0
xiM
i
1 q(M2) =
n−1∑
j=0
yjM
j
2
and then
Ma11 M
a2
2 =
n−1∑
i=0, j=0
xiyjM
i
1M
j
2 (1)
where xi, yj are indeterminates. Observe that the system is solvable in polyno-
mial time with m = n2, k = 2n and ε = 14 and expected running time O(n
2).
We pick now any solution and write down p(M1) and q(M2).
Remark The system given by Equation 1 is easy to solve, again even without
the knowledge of the algorithm presented in [2] since they consist of n2 homoge-
neous equations of degree 2 in 2n unknowns where we can perform a Gaussian
elimination-like computation on the variables ui,j := xiyj . We will show those
equations with an explicit example in the next subsection. It is also elementary
to observe that when the n2 by n2 matrix of the linear system∑
i,j
ui,jM
i
1M
j
2 =M
a1
1 M
a2
2
is invertible, the attack can be proven to be polynomial by the observation that
the ui,j are unique and the system xiyj = ui,j admits a solution by construction
(that can be found just by substitutions). In particular this happens when we
have the non degenerate case, in the sense that the k-vector space generated by
the M iN j is the whole matrix ring.
Remark
• We have at least one solution by the observation Ma11 M
a2
2 ∈ Imϕ.
• We are not claiming p(M1) = M
a1
1 and q(M2) = M
a2
2 . It has been
observed in [3] that in order to break the protocol it is enough to find
U ∈ Fq[M1] and V ∈ Fq[M2] such that U =M
a1
1 and V =M
a2
2
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• Since M1,M2 are invertible, also p(M1) and q(M2) are.
• Ma11 M
a2
2 = p(M1)q(M2) implies
(p(M1)
−1Ma11 )(M
a2
2 q(M2)
−1) = 1
Eve gets the key thanks to the computation
p(M1)
−1Ma1+b11 M
a2+b2
2 q(M2)
−1 =
p(M1)
−1M b11 M
a1
1 M
a2
2 M
b2
2 q(M2)
−1 =
M b11 (p(M1)
−1Ma11 )(M
a2
2 q(M2)
−1)M b22 =
M b11 (p(M1)
−1Ma11 M
a2
2 q(M2)
−1)M b22 =
M b11 · 1 ·M
b2
2 =M
b1
1 M
b2
2 = K
where the second equality is due to lemma 2.1 and the very last one by the
solution of the system 1.
3.1 Example
Let p = 569 and G = GL2(F569),
M1 =
(
12 34
11 99
)
and
M2 =
(
172 94
91 125
)
.
Alice chooses (a1, a2) = (449, 41). Bob chooses (b1, b2) = (509, 131). Alice
computes
C1 =M
a1
1 M
a2
2 =
(
502 108
3 322
)
and sends that to Bob. Bob computes the secret key
K =M b11 M
b2
2 =
(
273 85
436 278
)
and
M b11 CM
b2
2 =
(
501 343
200 170
)
and sends this last value to Alice. Alice now decrypts as
M−a11 M
b1
1 CM
b2
2 M
−a2
2 = K. Eve writes the system
(x0Id+ x1M1)(y0Id+ y1M2) = C
4
consisting of the equations

x0y0 + 172x0y1 + 12x1y0 + 37x1y1 = 502
94x0y1 + 34x1y0 + 257x1y1 = 108
91x0y1 + 11x1y0 + 90x1y1 = 3
x0y0 + 125x0y1 + 99x1y0 + 322x1y1 = 322
Eve can easily find a solution of this system by a relinearization of the kind
xiyj =: ui,j ; e.g. (x0, x1, y0, y1) = (1, 166, 244, 168). She now performs the
computation
(x0Id+ x1M1)
−1Ma1+b11 M
a2+b2
2 (y0Id+ y1M2)
−1 =(
273 85
436 278
)
= K
4 Cryptanalysis of the public key patented vari-
ant of the protocol
4.1 Brief description
In this section we cryptanalise the patent US7184551. Observe that the
patented protocol is roughly k times computationally more expensive than RSA,
where k is the order of the matrices we are using.
Public key
• Alice chooses A,C ∈ GLk(Zn) for n = pq and p, q prime numbers
• B = CAC and G ∈ Zn[C]
• Alice publishes (A,B,G)
Encryption
• Bob choses D ∈ Zn[G]
• Bob computes K = DBD and E = DAD
• Let M be the message in GLk(Zn)
• Bob sends (KM,E)
Decryption
• Alice computes CEC = K
• Alice decrypts as K−1KM
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4.2 Cryptanalysis
The idea behind this cryptanalysis is the same as in the previous sections, we
just need to make a revision of what we did before. In this section we prove
that the problem of breaking the protocol above can be reduced to factoring a
modulus. If M ∈Mk×k(Zn), let Mp and Mq denote its two reductions modulo
p and q respectively. We reduce G, E and A modulo p and write the system
Ep =

k−1∑
j=0
xjG
j
p

Ap
(
k−1∑
i=0
xiG
j
p
)
(2)
in k unknowns and k2 homogeneous degree 2 equations over Fkp. We can assure
at least one solution by the construction of Ep = DpApDp, since Dp can be
written in terms of low powers of G. We apply again the algorithm presented
in [2] getting one solution for the system in polynomial time with ε = 1/2. This
solution identifies a matrix D′ ∈Mk×k(Fp) such that
D′ApD
′ = DpApDp = Ep mod p.
Observe that we get the partial secret key Kp = K mod p by multiplying Bp
on both sides by D′
D′BpD
′ = D′CpApCpD
′ =
CpD
′ApD
′Cp = CpDpApDpCp = Kp mod p.
We perform the same procedure modulo q getting D′′Mk×k(Fq) such that
D′′BqD
′′ = Kq. Since we have the computable isomorphism of rings
ψ :Mk×k(Zn) −→Mk×k(Fp)⊕Mk×k(Fq)
given by the Chinese Remainder Theorem we are able to recover the secret
key K just by taking the preimage of the pair (Kp,Kq) through ψ. Note that
ψ−1(Kp,Kq) is exactly K by observing that Kp and Kq are necessarily the
reductions of K modulo p and q (by the homomorphism properties of ψ) and
then that K = ψ−1(Kp,Kq) since ψ is a bijection.
Remark Observe that the equations in (2) are even easier then the ones in
(1) since they have the same structure but half of the unknowns. What is
again important to observe is that Cayley Hamilton theorem always assures us
a solution. In the next subsection we give an example to show how they look
like.
4.3 Example
Let n = 6133 = 541 · 113 and Alice’s public key constructed as follow: let C be(
243 112
234 233
)
6
and
A =
(
121 231
144 242
)
then
B = CAC = B =
(
36124 40493
39554 16490
)
Then we choose G = 14 · 1 + 3374 · C =(
25167 11090
55920 52560
)
.
The public key will be (A,B,G). Bob secret key is constructed as follow: Let
D = 34125 · 1 + 7123G =
(
56710 10234
36665 40513
)
K =
(
20609 51651
14785 1448
)
and
E = DAD =
(
57174 14133
7237 20711
)
.
Let M be any message, then Bob sends
(KM,E)
Eve attacks the system as follows: she reduces E modulo 541 getting
E541 =
(
369 67
204 153
)
.
She has now to solve the system
(x1 + yG541)A541(x1 + yG541) = E541
getting for example the solution (x0, y0) = (220, 159), so we get K541 = (x01 +
y0G541)B541(x01 + y0G541) and then
K541 =
(
51 256
178 366
)
Analogously one gets K113 = (x01+y0G113)B113(x01+y0G113) where (x0, y0) =
(55, 49), getting (
43 10
95 92
)
By the Chinese Remainder Theorem we get
K =
(
20609 51651
14785 1448
)
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5 Conclusion
We have presented a polynomial time attack to the noncommutative protocol
proposed in [1] and [5]. Moreover we have shown the weakness of such a protocol
over any subgroup of matrices over any finite field. We have also made the
attack work on the protocol presented in the patent [6] showing that breaking
the cryptosystem can be reduced to factoring. It would be very interesting
to find analogous noncommutative schemes that are resistant to the attack we
presented. In particular the key point is that the vector space structure of
matrix rings over fields is a major weakness of such kind of protocols. We
would like to thank Gerard Maze and Davide Schipani for their very helpful
ideas and suggestions.
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